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THE COMITY DOCTRINEt
Hessel E. Yntema*
HE doctrine of comity, as developed in the Netherlands during
the last quarter of the Seventeenth Century, for the first time
posed in stark simplicity the basic dilemma of conflicts law in modem times to mediate between the pretensions of territorial sovereignty and the needs of international commerce. As Ulrik Huber, the
most influential exponent of the doctrine, observed: "Exempla,
quibus utemur, ad juris privati species maxime quidem pertinebunt,
sed judicium de illis unice juris publici rationibus constat, & exinde
definiri debent.'' 1 ["The examples which we shall use belong principally to the category of private law but their treatment rests exclusively on principles of public law, and they must be defined
accordingly."] In this summary account, it is proposed to sketch
the background, to restore the meaning-still too frequently misunderstood-and to consider the relevance at the present time of
the basic principle in this historic doctrine. It is hoped that a modest
excursus of this nature in a field of special interest to the MaxPlanck-Institut fur auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht,
founded by Ernst Rabel, may be accepted in acknowledgement of
the signal contributions to the advancement of comparative legal
science, for which we are indebted to the distinguished jurist, who
has directed the Institut since 1945, Hans Dolle.

T

I
In the evolution of the theories developed by Western legal
science to resolve the problems presented by the diversity of laws,
characteristic of medieval and modern times, there have been two
turning-points of fundamental significance. The first was the genial
invention of the glossators towards the end of the Twelfth Century,
A.D. that foreign law, in appropriate instances, should be applied to
foreign cases. Originally, in the early Middle Ages, the regime of
personal law prevailed, a system in which the rights and duties of

t Reprinted with permission from 2 VON DEUTSCHEN ZUM EUROPAISCHEN REcHT,
Festschrift filr Hans Dolle 65 (von Caemmerer, Nikisch, and Zweigert, eds., 1962). Unless otherwise indicated, English translations are by Dr. Vera Bolgar, University of
Michigan Law School, in consultation with Professor Roger A. Pack, Department of
Classical Studies, University of Michigan.-Ed.
• The late Research Professor Emeritus of Comparative Law, University of
Michigan.-Ed.
I. Ulrik Huber, De Jure Civitatis, Lib. III, Sect. IV, Cap. I., 14, at p. 607 in the
3rd edition of 1968.
[9]
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individuals were derived from the customary laws of the respective
ethnic groups to which they belonged. For the communities in a
sedentary agricultural society, each cloistered in its separate vale,
this simple conception expressing the instinctive attachment of the
individual to his group, doubtless seemed obvious and, with infrequent litigation between members of different groups, sufficed to
determine the applicable law, which was identified by the forum of
the defendant, or in other words, of his group.
With the progressive development of orderly, centralized government and the expansion of commercial relations, various causes conspired to undermine the regime of personal laws. The original
Germanic tribes were mixed by intermarriages, and new ethnic
groups appeared; the memory of the ancient customary laws faded
with the passage of time; and in the kingdoms that were formed,
centralized legislation, in England implemented by an effective
organization of royal courts, overrode the local laws. As a result, the
principle that each man was governed by his own law-the law of
his ethnic group-became increasingly burdensome as soon as it was
recognized that the law of each party, plaintiff or defendant, should
be respected and the instances multiplied in which account had to
be taken of diverse customary laws. The celebrated complaint of
Saint Agobard against the lex Gundobadi of Burgundy, cited by
E. M. Meijers, depicts the situation: "Tanta diversitas legum quanta
non solum in singulis regionibus aut civitatibus sed etiam in multis
domibus habetur. Nam plerumque contingit ut simul eant aut
sedeant quinque homines et nullus eorum communem legem cum
altero habeat."2 ["Such a diversity of laws exists not only within
certain regions or cities but even in many households. Indeed, it
frequently happens that five men get together or meet with each
other and none of them has a law in common with any other."]
This situation was still further complicated by the spread of feudalism, under which, along with the personal law, not only the tenure
of land but all questions relating to inheritance were governed by
the law of the land-the consuetudo patriae. Under these conditions,
there was an obvious need to harmonize the multiplicity of local
customs and laws on a more rational basis.
The solution of this problem was precipitated by the revival of
Roman law studies in Italy during the Twelfth and Thirteenth
Centuries. The discovery of the manuscripts of the Code and Di2. E. M. Meijers, L'Histoire des Principes Fondamentaux du Droit International
Prive a partir du Moyen A.ge, specialement dans !'Europe Occidentale: Recueil des
Cours de l'Academie de Droit International vol. 49 (1934-III) 543-68 b (561-62).
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gests of Justinian, on which legal instruction in the nascent universities was primarily based, made it necessary for Irnerius and his
followers not only to establish the texts but also to determine their
meaning and scope of application. The volume and complexity of
the imperial laws of Rome, reflecting the development of Roman
law during a thousand years and enacted, not like a modem code
as a systematic statement of legal principles, but as an imperfectly
organized compilation of constitutions of the emperors and opinions of the classical jurists relating to particular problems and
cases, in which the refined conceptions of Roman jurisprudence
were embodied along with a variety of antinomies and apparent
contradictions-the so-called emblemata of Tribonian-necessarily
posed, as an essential aspect of their interpretation, the question of
their relation to the existing customary laws and the growing body
of enactments of the autonomous cities in Italy and elsewhere,
known as statuta, not to speak of legislation by other secular authorities and the canon law. The question must have pressed with
singular actuality on the attention of the "doctores" of Bologna in
view of the international complexion of their audience-by 1200
AD. in the time of Azo, we are told, there were 10,000 students at
Bologna, the majority from foreign parts, who had come to study
the laws of imperial Rome. It was customarily elaborated in the
exposition of the famous initial text in the Codex of Justinian, the
lex Cunctos Populos (C. I. I. I.).
In resolving this fundamental problem of the hierarchy of legal
orders, the glossators and their successors made two contributions
of central importance for the future development of conflicts law.
In the first place, they established the civil law of Rome, as adapted
to current conditions, as the common law of Western Europe. This
remarkable achievement, however incomplete in acceptance or
practice the doctrine of the preeminence of the law of Rome as the
criterion of positive justice might be in particular times or places,
may be attributed not merely to the superiority of the ancient jurisprudence over the more primitive and incomplete customary laws,
but more especially to the persistence of the idea that the Holy
Roman Empire survived and that accordingly the Corpus Juris
Civilis obtained as the general law. The success with which this preconception was inculcated in those who came to the universities to
learn the civil law, was doubtless due to the fact that, as Maitland
observed, taught law is tough law. However this may be, this principle served to provide criteria for the recognition of local customs
and particular enactments, to delimit their respective spheres of

12
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application, derogating from the ius commune, and to supply a
basis for unification, to the extent that they did not apply. The conception that there is a common subsidiary body of legal doctrine,
in the first instance elaborated in the learned studies of those versed
in the civil law and eventually to be evolved in comparison with
the developments in national legal systems, has been the first and
essential postulate to provide a degree of unity in the diversity of
local laws.
The second contribution, a natural corollary of the first, was to
establish a rational basis for choice of law among competing local
customs or municipal enactments according to the nature of the
case. This involved abandonment of the idea that laws are exclusively personal in their application and, after a brief period of
initial dispute, rejection also of the view attributed to Azo, which
doubtless in some degree reflected current practice, that the lex f ori
should apply. The initial justification for a more reasonable basis
of decision was found in equity, which, it may be recalled, the Constitutio Placuit of Constantine of 314 A.D. (C. 1. 14. 1.) ordained
should prevail over strict law. This genial suggestion was made in
a glossa of the last quarter of the Twelfth Century, ascribed to
Aldricus, a highly esteemed younger contemporary of the four
"doctores," to the effect that, if men from different provinces, with
different customs, litigate before one and the same judge, on the
question which of these the judge should follow, according to
Aldricus, "respondeo eam quae potior et utilior videtur. debet enim
iudicare secundum quod melius ei visum fuerit." 3 ["I reply, the
one that seems better and more useful. He should pass judgment in
accordance with what seems better to him."] It is of interest, as
Neumeyer points out,4 that the concluding sentence in the glossa
recalls the clause in the judicial oath prescribed in Justinian's
Eighth Novel: "et omnem aequitatem servabo, secundum quod
visum fuerit mihi iustum.'' ["I shall serve above all equity, following what seems just to me.''] With the acceptance of this view, presumably early in the Thirteenth Century, the science of private international law was founded-on the ground of equity. It remained
to define in this context what equity requires.
This has been the task of succeeding generations, in the execution of which it has not always been borne in mind that the problem of choice of law is essentially to determine what is fair; too
3. Cited by Karl Neumeyer, Die gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung des internationalen
Privat- und Strafrechts bis Bartolus, Pt. 2 (1916) 67.
4. Ibid., 68, n. 2.
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often, equity has been subordinated to strict law, inexorable logic,
or provincial policy. For the present purpose, it is not possible nor
necessary to follow in detail the subsequent evolution of doctrine,
but only to sketch the background, on which the comity doctrine
appeared in the Seventeenth Century. For this, it must suffice to
indicate the chief positions that were taken to delimit the spheres
of application of particular laws, or statuta as the local enactments
of the municipalities were termed. This involved a flexible process
of statutory interpretation, in which not only the subject matter of
the statutory dispositions but also considerations of equity and convenience, particularly as evidenced by the practice of important
courts, and the few pertinent Roman texts, were taken into account.
In effect, as a review of the salient principles that came to be accepted will suggest, the sphere of the personal law, conceived not
as a quality of attachment to a group with which each individual
is born but as subjection to a local political power, was severely restricted but not entirely abandoned. Indeed, in the scheme of the
statutists, the most important and disputed distinction was between
the statute personal and the statute real.
In a brief enumeration of these principles, we may take as a
guide the classic commentary of Bartolus on the lex Cunctos
Populos (C. 1. 1. 1.), in which the doctrines developed by the middle of the Fourteenth Century are systematically summarized, and
which for two centuries thereafter enjoyed undisputed authority.
The exposition is concerned with two inter-related questions: the
application of statutes to those not subjects, and the effects to be
given statutes without the territory of the enacting authority. As
will appear, in this scheme the application of the commonplace,
statutum non ligat nisi subditos, which was originally posed to restrict the application of the lex f ori to aliens, was limited to the
personal law. The chief propositions enunciated by Bartolus may
be listed as follows:
I. In setting forth the law applicable to contracts, a threefold
distinction is made, whether the statute concerns the form (solennitatem) of the contract, procedure (litis ordinationem), or performance of the contract (jurisdictionem ex ipso contractu evenientis
executionis). 5
2. Questions relating to ordinatio litis are referable to the place
of litigation, i.e., the lex fori. 6
5. Bartolus, Ad legem Cunctos Populos (C. 1. 1. 1.) No. 13.
6. Ibid., No. 15.
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3. Questions concerning solennitas of a contract are to be referred to the place of the contract.7
4. Questions relating to decisio litis, i.e., the merits as distinguished from ordinatio litis, are further distinguished. Those arising with respect to the nature of the contract itself, at the time of
contracting, are decided by reference to the place of contract,
namely, where the contract is celebrated; those arising ex post facto,
from negligence or default, by reference to the place of performance, where the negligence or default occurs. 8 An exception is
made in the case of dotal contracts; these are governed by the husband's law. 9
5. In the case of delicts, the statute applies within the territory,
not only to subjects but also to foreigners, unless they may be
deemed to have been ignorant of the statute, e.g., if the statute does
not accord with the ius commune and there has been an insufficient
period of residence to presume knowledge of the statute.10 Such
statutes, if they so provide, also apply to offenses committed outside
the territory by subjects.11
6. On questions relating to wills, Bartolus holds that a statute
relating to form, e.g., reducing the number of witnesses normally
required, unless restricted to subjects, also applies to aliens in the
territory on the principle locus regit actum,12 but not as respects
their testamentary capacity.13
7. The distinction between real statutes (circa rem) and personal statutes (circa personam) is recognized. Questions regarding
rights relating to a thing itself are referred to the place where the
thing is situated.14
8. A personal statute applies only to subjects: statutum non
ligat nisi subditos. 15 As respects the extraterritorial effects of a personal statute, a distinction is made between permissive and prohibitive statutes, the latter being again subdivided into "favorable" and
"odious" statutes; only prohibitive statutes, which are "favorable,"
have extraterritorial effect.16
Two observations may be made on the system of conflicts law de7. Ibid., Nos. 14, 32.
8. Ibid., Nos. 15, 16.
9. Ibid., Nos. 17, 19.
10. Ibid., No. 20.
11. Ibid., No. 48.
12. Ibid., Nos. 24, 25.
13. Ibid., No. 25.
14. Ibid., Nos. 27, 32.
15. Ibid., Nos. 25, 26.
16. Ibid., Nos. 32-34.

November 1966]

The Comity Doctrine

15

veloped in Italy, as thus summarized by Bartolus. In the first place,
it provided a more flexible basis to satisfy the needs of international
commerce than either the primitive regime of personal laws or the
system introduced by feudalism, in which the law of the land was
paramount. In effect, other categories of statutes, neither real nor
personal, were recognized, as exemplified by the rule locus regit
actum. The second is, as E. M. Meijers has pointed out, that the
scheme in the last analysis rested on three conceptions; the sovereign power of legislation, the existence of a common law, and the
autonomy of the will of the parties, the relative consideration of
which has ever since been of concern in this field of law. 17
The influence of Bartolus was most extensive in regions where
the Roman law was received, but in the pays de droit coutumier, in
northern France and Flanders, its effect was limited. Here the
regime of realty prevailed; the law of the land governed not only
rights directly affecting immovables but all transactions relating
thereto. Argentre recognized in addition to the real and personal
statutes a third category of mixed statutes, both real and personal,
but these were treated exactly as real statutes. As stated in his celebrated treatise De Donationibus:
Quae realia aut mixta sunt, haud dubie locorum & rerum situm
sic spectant, ut aliis legibus quam territorii iudicari non possint,
terminos quidem legislatoris populi non excedunt, sed nee vicissim
exceduntur ipsa & ut infinita sit commerciorum libertas iure Romano, contractibus, testamentis, negotiationibus, tamen ea sic infringitur, ut moribus & legibus locorum cedat. 18
[Those statutes which are real or mixed are determined without
doubt by the situs of the land and things, inasmuch as they can
not be governed by laws other than those of the state. These laws,
of course, do not apply beyond the legislator's boundaries and
neither are they, in tum, applied; and though by Roman law the
freedom of transactions regarding contracts, wills, and commerce
is unlimited, this freedom is thus nevertheless infringed to the
extent that it yields to the customs and laws of the state.]

On the other hand, the ancient customary rule, mobilia ossibus
inhaerent, persisted from the regime of the personal law, and some
advance was made by removing from the regime of the statute real,
statutes not directly related to land, concerning marriage, majority,
guardianship, and the like, which were classified even by Argentre
as purely personal-quae pure de statu personarum agunt. A further development was the acceptance, relatively late, of the prin17. op. cit., supra n. 2, at 635.
18. Art. 218, Glossa 6, No. 9.
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ciple locus regit actum to determine the form of acts, such as
testaments. The most important reform, however, was accomplished
by the ingenious doctrine of Dumoulin, which was designed to secure unity in the regime of matrimonial property by circumventing
the application of the local real statute to each separate holding of
the spouses. For this purpose, instead of directly attacking the
regime of realite, he resorted to the conception of the autonomy of
the parties, on the ancient principle that the intent of contracting
parties, express or tacit, is a source of law that in its sphere of application transcends the mere authority of a statute as such, limited
to its territory. But with these exceptions the lex terrae applied,
and the delimitation of its application in cases where it did not
coincide with the personal law, i.e., of the domicile, had become
confused by so many conflicting opinions that, to quote Argentre
again, ea recudere valde esset operosum, b pugnantes componere,
aut comparare impossibile. 19 On this background, the contributions
of the jurists in the Netherlands during the Seventeenth Century
are to be considered.
II
The revolt of the Netherlands, precipitated in 1568 by the repressive measures taken by the Duke of Alva as vicegerent of Philip
II of Spain to "reconquer" and subject the seventeen Provinces in
the Low Countries to Spanish domination, opened an eventful page
in the history of modern Europe. The transient hope of unity under the Pacification of Ghent of 1576 broke on the issue of religion;
within four years, the Catholic Provinces in the south, the Spanish
troops having been withdrawn, made peace on advantageous terms,
leaving the seven northern Provinces that in 1579 had formed the
Union, the "eeuwich Verbondt ende Eendracht," of Utrecht to continue the unequal and bitter contest with the then greatest power
in Christendom. The Eighty Years' War, as it has been called, was
not concluded until 1648 by the Peace of Munster on terms highly
favorable to the United Netherlands. The cause for which the war
was fought was liberty, not as conceived two centuries later by
Rousseau, but in the more conservative sense of the Sixteenth Century: freedom from political oppression and the inquisition, maintenance of the traditional rights and privileges of the Provinces,
their nobles, cities, and inhabitants, and tolerance of religious
belief and worship, against a foreign tyrant. The price paid to vindicate these liberties was high, but the fact that they were won was
19. Ibid., No. 1.
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of momentous consequence to Holland and to humanity. More immediately, the revolution ushered in the Golden Era of the Netherlands.
Within a generation, the United Netherlands became the most
progressive and, with the collapse of Philip's grandiose plans for
world empire and internal disorders in France, Germany, and England, a major power in Europe. The protracted conflict with Spain
released unsuspected energies and evoked a remarkable expansion
of commerce, culture, and industry in the Low Countries. At the
beginning of the Seventeenth Century, if we may believe the accounts of English voyagers, Dutch ships in number were treble
those of England; they sailed the most distant seas, established trading stations and colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, and for
an interval became the most successful competitors for the carrying
trade of the world. Coincidently, the mainstreams of European culture concentrated in Holland and the sister Provinces along the
mouth of the Rhine. Humanism, science, literature, art, architecture, theology, philosophy, and jurisprudence, all found here notable and in some cases consummate expression. The Netherlands
became the chief mart of world commerce, not only in goods but
also in ideas, the relatively free atmosphere offering asylum to those
who had to flee other countries on account of their ideas and beliefs
-to Huguenots and Jews, Pilgrims and Cavaliers-the spirit of
Athens again resurgent at the threshold of the modern world. A
portentous scene in the progress of constitutional government it
was, advertising the advantages of freedom over absolutism. As
Figgis has remarked: "To estimate our debt to Holland is hard; to
overestimate it is harder." 20
In this scene, various factors favored reconsideration of the doctrine of conflicts law. First and foremost was the polity of the
Netherlands, federated in the Union of Utrecht. By this, the Provinces bound themselves, "as if they were one Province," in a perpetual, indissoluble Union for their defense not only against Spain
but also against any princes or powers, foreign or domestic, seeking
to use force to make war upon any one of them, even if it were to
restore the Catholic religion. It was also expressly provided in Article I of the Treaty that the traditional privileges and rights of the
Provinces, their cities, constituent members, and inhabitants, should
not be diminished: on these principles, the Corte Vertooninghe
issued by the States of Holland and West Friesland declared in
20. Figgis, Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, 1414-1625 (Cambridge 1907), at 197.
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1587, they had been governed and, never conquered, had preserved
their freedom for eight hundred years. Provision was made for
meetings of the States General, the deputies of the Provinces, with
undefined powers in matters affecting the general interest, except
that certain questions of special importance, such as peace, truce,
and war and the imposition of general contributions, should be determined by common advice and consent. Originally, it was not contemplated that the Union should be without a sovereign; but the
successive efforts to procure a successor to Philip II after the
Afzweering in 1581 to aid in the war against Spain were unavailing,
and upon the termination of the disastrous governorship of the Earl
of Leicester in 1588, they were abandoned. Thus, the Republic
crept in unawares, as Robespierre later said of the French Republic.
Perhaps, if William the Silent had not been assassinated in 1584,
he might eventually have accepted the crown; as it was, the indelible loyalty of the Dutch to his memory and to his House had to
suffice during the Republic as a source of national unity. Until
1795, the Union of Utrecht remained the basic constitution of the
Netherlands, exemplifying the observation of Grotius that, while
the summum imperium is a thing one and in itself indivisible, it
may nevertheless be divided into parts, subjective or potential, i.e.,
by co-sovereignty of several rulers or by division of powers.21 The
consequences of this decentralized regime were chronic weakness in
the central authority and pronounced independence of the Provinces-a fertile field for conflicts of laws.
More specifically, while the jurists in the Netherlands, indoctrinated in the civil law, were acquainted with the teachings of
their predecessors in Italy and France concerning statutes real and
personal, notably as related in the works of Burgundus and Argentre, two factors compelled reconsideration of the traditional
doctrines and indeed led to a second turning-point of fundamental
significance in the history of conflicts law. The .first was the elaboration of the theory of territorial sovereignty by Bodin in 1576 in
Les Six Livres de la Republique, more widely disseminated in the
Latin version of 1584; this theory justifying the independence of
the national states emerging in Europe, was promptly accepted in
the Netherlands early in the Seventeenth Century. Consistently
with their constitutional principles, the Dutch jurists sought on
various grounds to reconcile with the rule of law the conception
that in each independent state there is an ultimate source of authority, a summa potestas, subject to no superior; at the same time,
21. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads (1625) lib. I, cap. 3,

§

xvii, I.
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they accepted without question the principle definitively established by Justinian, that the first attribute of the imperium is the
power of legislation. The assumption that this power is limited to
the territory of the sovereign necessarily attracted attention to the
grounds on which the extraterritorial application of personal statutes might be justified.
In the second place, a more subtle and pervasive factor was also
present. The Netherlands had become a commercial, sea-faring nation with a more liberal attitude towards foreigners who came to
the Netherlands or with whom they traded than prevailed in countries such as France and England where landed interests were still
predominant. It was characteristic that, in Article XVII of the
Union of Utrecht, for example, the Provinces, Cities, and Inhabitants of the Netherlands, in order to avoid all occasion of war with
foreign powers, had solemnly undertaken "soo wel den Uytheemschen als Inghesetenen van voorz Provintien t'administreren goet
recht ende ]ustitie", ["to administer good law and justice to foreigners and citizens alike,"] a generous provision in its time, answering to the needs of commerce for peace as well as "good law and
Justice" for aliens equally with citizens, in which perhaps the idea
of comity may be implicitly discerned. 22
The concern in the present article is a limited one: to review
the reorientation of the basic doctrines of private international law
in the Netherlands in the light of the conditions briefly sketched
above. For this purpose, it is not necessary to examine the solutions
of particular conflicts problems; these have been treated by more
competent hands, more particularly in the summary of the "doctrine hollandaise" in the magistral lectures of the late E. M. Meijers
at the Hague Academy of International Law in 193423 and in more
detail in Professor Kollewijn's history of the Netherlands literature
on private international law to 1880, completed in 1935 and published in Dutch in 1937.24 As Meijers has observed,25 neither the
problems nor the solutions to be found in this literature are original-all were anticipated in France; the new departure is "comitas."
Fortunately for the present purpose, this conception was developed
in a few well-known works published before 1700, and their consideration will suffice. It is hoped that such a review of a topic, often
22. In this connection, for a summary of the legal position of foreigners in the
Netherlands in 1619, see Grotius, Inleidinge, I, 13.
23. op. cit., supra note 2, pages 653-672.
24. Kollewijn, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Wetenschap van het Internationaal Privaatrecht tot 1880 (Amsterdam 1937).
25. op. cit., supra note 2, at 654.
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ventilated but even today too frequently misconceived, may be of
interest, not only since the materials are in Latin and Dutch texts
of the time, not widely known and little read, but also since, as
Meijers has remarked, 26 the doctrine of comity originated and still
expresses the current presuppositions of private international law.
In this enquiry, the chief points to be considered are the positions
taken in the works in question as regards (1) the conception of
territorial sovereignty, (2) the traditional statutory doctrine, and
(3) the grounds on which the extraterritorial effects of foreign judgments and statutes are rested.
Despite the diversity of the laws and customs of the Provinces
and the frequency of conflicts of laws, often deplored, in the Netherlands, no systematic treatise on the subject matter appeared until
after the middle of the Seventeenth Century. In 1625, the epochal
work of Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, was published, laying the
foundations of public international law for the modern world of
independent, national states, but not including private international law. Nevertheless, certain seminal conceptions were demonstrated in this work, significant in the later development: the absolute conception of territorial sovereignty, covering all things, all
persons, including subditi temporarii, and all transactions within
the territory, and the conception that the independent sovereign
states form a universitas, a community governed by the common
law of nature and of nations-jus illud quod inter populos plures
aut populorum rectores intercedit, sive ab ipsa natura profectum,
aut divinis constitutum legibus, sive moribus b pacto tacito introductum.27 ["-that body of law which is concerned with the mutual
relations among states or rulers of states, whether derived from
nature, or established by divine ordinances, or having its origin in
custom and tacit agreement."]*
The first work to appear in the Netherlands, specifically treating
conflicts of laws, was published in 1653, the Tractatus de Jure Conjugum of Christian Rodenburg, a member of the Supreme Court of
Utrecht, in which, to avoid repetition, the author included the celebrated preliminary treatise, De Jure quod Oritur ex Statutorum,
vel Consuetudinum Discrepantium Confiictu. This follows the
French statutory doctrine as expounded by Argentre and Burgundus, and its merits are attested by the fact that a century later it
was translated by Boullenois to serve as the text for the "observa26. Ibid., at 667.
27. Grotius, op. cit., supra note 21, Prolegomena, I.
• As translated in GROTIUS, THE LAw OF WAR AND PEACE 9 (Kelsey transl. 1925).
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tions" in his well-known Traite. 28 However, there are improvements on the doctrine of Argentre. By legal construction, moveables
are deemed to be located at the domicile of the owner and therefore
are classified as real. More important, the category of mixed statutes
is rejected, restoring the traditional dichotomy of statutes real and
statutes personal in the older doctrine and enlarging the scope of
the latter to include the determination of capacity even for transactions affecting land in another jurisdiction. It is recognized that
the effect of real statutes is limited to the territory-illa in res
scripta territorii sui concludantur metis.29 At the same time, the
extraterritorial effect of personal statutes concerning capacity is explained on the ground that they do not have direct effect on things.
This conclusion is justified in a famous passage by the very nature
and necessity of the case (ipsa rei natura ac necessitas), which suggests that, in the conceptions of the time, the extraterritorality of
personal statutes has a legal basis. 30 This explanation of what pre28. L. Boullenois, Traite de la Personnalite et de la Realite des Lobe, Coutumes,
ou Statuts (Paris 1766).
29. Rodenburg, Tractatus de Jure Conjugum (Utrecht 1653), at 21.
30. "Quid igitur rei in causa est, quod personalia statuta territorium egrediantur?
unicum hoc ipsa rei natura ac necessitas invexit, ut, cum de statu ac conditione
hominum quaeritur, uni solummodo judici, &: quidem domicilii, universum in illa jus sit
attributum: cum enim ab uno certoque loco statum hominis legem accipere necesse
esset, quod absurdum earumque rerum naturaliter inter se pugna foret, ut in quot
loca quis iter faciens, aut navigans delatus fuerit, totidem ille statum mutaret aut
conditionem; ut uno eodemque tempore hie sui juris, illic alieni futurus sit, uxor
simul in potestate viri, & extra eandem sit, alio loco habeatur quis prodigus, alio
frugi; ac praeterea quod persona certo loco non affigeretur, cum res soli loco fixae citra
incommodum ejusdem legibus subjaceant, summa providentia constitutum est, ut a
loco domicilii, cui quis larem fovendo se subdiderit, statum ac conditionem induat:
illis legislatoribus, pro soli sui genio, optime omnium compertum habentibus, qua
judicii maturitate polleant subditi, ut possint constituere, qui eorum ac quando ad
sua tuenda ncgotia indigeant auctoritate. Haec igitur personarum qualitas ac conditio
ubi venerit applicanda ad res aut actus alterius territorii, jam indirecte ac per consequentiam vis illius personalis statuti extra statuentis pertinget locum: cum & alias
non insolitum sit multa indirecte permitti & per consequentiam, quae directe &
expressim non valerent." Ibid., at 23-24. [""What, therefore, is the reason that personal
statutes are effective beyond their territory? This was introduced uniquely by the very
nature and necessity of the case, that whenever the status and condition of persons
are to be determined, all the applicable law should be referred to one judge and, in
fact, to the judge of the domicile: now, assuming that it were necessary to apply to the
status of a person the law of one certain place, this would be absurd and would
naturally lead to conflicts, so that a person would change his status or condition
whenever he arrived at a different place in the course of a journey or a voyage; thus a
person might be at one and the same time legally independent here and legally dependent there, a wife might be simultaneously within or without her husband's legal
control, and someone might be a spendthrift in one place and a frugal man in
another; and further, in order that a person be not tied to a certain place, even though
real property attached to a place is, without inconvenience, subject to the laws of same,
it was very providently established that his status and condition be assumed from the
domicile, the place to which he submitted himself by setting up his home: the
legislators, in keeping with the spirit of their own land, regard it as the best solution
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viously had been taken for granted leads Meijers to regard Rodenburg as the real founder of the Dutch doctrine. 31
In 1661, the De Statutis eorumque Concursu of Paulus Voet,
Professor at the Academy of Utrecht, appeared, a monograph of
200 pages, couched in a concise and sometimes crabbed style in the
form of a catechism of questions and answers, each supported by
citations displaying wide acquaintance with the civil law literature.
Of the twelve Sections in this work, the fourth, after defining a statute as a particular law (]us particulare), enacted by a legislator
other than the Emperor, presents a classification of statutes in the
traditional pattern, following the more polished exposition of
Rodenburg, but with two important differences. First, while Voet
agrees with Rodenburg in rejecting the category of mixed statutes,
as conceived by Argentre and Burgundus, he proposes that certain
statutes principally relate not to things nor to persons, but to the
mode and form (de modo vel solemnitate) of all transactions and
causes, judicial and extrajudicial; in their effects, these are mixed
statutes, like real statutes binding all within the territory and like
personal statutes extending to all goods (bona) wherever located.32
The second difference is of special interest in the present connection. Voet apparently is perplexed, in his treatment of personal
statutes, by the dissenting opinions of the "doctores," which he
faithfully notes but is unable to reconcile, and also seems to be concerned that Articles 1 and 16 of the Novellae Constitutiones of
Utrecht, on April 14, 1659, expressly decreed the prohibitions on
gifts between husband and wife and on testation by minors, respectively, to be real, not personal as he deemed proper.33
In consequence, Voet concludes with the enunciation of four
rules, not too well conceived, applicable to all personal statutes, and
then proceeds to state that, in his opinion, no statute according to
the civil law (de ratione juris civilis), whether in rem or in personam, directly or indirectly, extends beyond the territory of the
legislator. This opinion, supported by texts in Justinian's Digest,34
that the subjects should be able to decide in accordance with their best judgment
which of them needs and when do they need their authority for the protection of
their transactions. Therefore, when this quality and condition of persons is applied
to things and acts in another territory, then indirectly and as a consequence the
validity of these personal statutes will extend beyond the territory of the legislator:
particularly because it is not uncommon that much is permitted indirectly and by
inference which would not be valid directly and expressly.'1
31. op. cit., supra note 2, at page 666.
32. Voet, Sect. IV, Cap. II, 4.
33. Ibid., Sect. IV, Cap. III, 2-5, 12, 13. Cf. A. a Wesel, Commentarius ad Novellas
Constitutiones Ultrajectinas, etc., in Opera Omnia (Amsterdam 1701) at pp. 1, 229.
34. D.2.1.20; D.26.5.27.pr.; D.26.7.47.7.; D.42.5.12.1.

November 1966]

The Comity Doctrine

23

is followed by a list of nine exceptions in which statutes have extraterritorial effect. Among these it may be noted, the principle of
party autonomy is recognized; if a contract or convention of the
parties is entered into pursuant to the statute of the territory, even
if conceived in rem, it will extend to goods (bona) located elsewhere
-it does not affect the goods as such, but the person in respect
thereof.35 Finally, at the end of the list, it is observed that at times,
when a people wishes to observe the customs of a neighboring people in comity (comiter) and in order that many valid transactions
may not be disturbed, it is customary for statutes to apply beyond
the territory of the legislator.36 For this, a fragment in Justinian's
Digest, attributed to the epistles of Proculus, is cited, stating that a
people federated with another people, alterius populi maiestatem
comiter conservaret, and that the clients of Rome, qui maiestatem
nostram comiter conservare debent, are freemen. 37 Thus, the authority of Justinian was adduced by Paulus Voet to support the absolute conception of territorial sovereignty and to exemplify the
principle of comity in his new doctrine. 38
The doctrine of comity was restated in its final form in the
tractate, De Statutis, that Johannes Voet inserted as an Appendix
in the middle of the first Book of his celebrated Commentarius ad
Pandectas, first published in 1698. Before considering the works of
Ulrik Huber, which had previously appeared, it is convenient to
35. Voet, ibid., Sect. IV, Cap. II, 15, 16.
36. "Denique nonnunquam, dum populus vicinus vicini mores comiter vult observare, &: ne multa bene gesta turbarentur, de moribus, statuta territorium statuentis,
inspecto effectu, solent egredi 1.7, § fin.D.capthPostlim." Ibid., Sect. IV, Cap. II, 17.
["Finally, whenever a people wishes to observe the customs of a neighboring people
in comity and in order that many valid transactions may not be disturbed, after
considering their effect, statutes are customarily extended beyond the territory of the
legislator.'1
37. "Liber autem populus est is, qui nullius alterius populi potestati est subiectus:
sive is foederatus est item, sive aequo foedere in amicitiam venit sive foedere comprehensum est, ut is populus alterius populi maiestatem comiter conservaret. hoc enim
adicitur, ut intellegatur alterum populum superiorem esse, non ut intellegatur alterum
non esse liberum: et quemadmodum clientes nostros intellegimus liberos esse, etiamsi
neque auctoritate neque dignitate neque viri boni nobis praesunt, sic eos, qui maiestatem nostram comiter conservare debent, liberos esse intellegendum est." D.49.15.7.1.
["That nation is free which is not subject to the power of another nation. If they are
federated, whether the federation is based on friendship or on a treaty, one nation will
observe through comity the sovereignty of the other nation. It should be added that
it may be understood that one state holds a position of superiority but not that it
may be understood that the other state is not free. Just as we understand that our
clients are free men, even though they are not our equals in respect to authority,
standing, and legal status, so it must be understood that those are also free who are
under obligation to maintain our prestige through comity.'1 The well-known discussion of this fragment in Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Lib, I, Cap. ID, § 21,2, very
possibly suggested the reference to it by Voet.
38. Cf. the additional passages in Voet's work, cited by Meijers, op. cit., supra
note 2, at page 664, footnote 1.
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notice this contribution in which ]. Voet elaborated and perpetuated the doctrine of his father, Paulus, in a refined exposition of the
nobilissima statutorum diviso, as real, personal, and mixed, more
comprehensive and elegant in substance and in style, but without
essential change. Certain points nevertheless deserve mention. First,
the absolute theory of legislative sovereignty is broadly declared for
all kinds of statutes, but with special reference to res within the
territory; 39 Rodenburg's conception of rei natura ac necessitas, as
the basis of the extraterritorial effects of personal statutes respecting capacity, is expressly refuted on the ground that there is no
such necessity. 40 Second, the applicability of mixed statutes concerning the solennia of contracts and other acts is defined in detail,41
and it is urged that, when these concern things without the jurisdiction, such statutes may be deemed facul tative and not mandatory. 42 Third, the principle of private autonomy is extended to tacit
as well as express agreements, allowing private individuals to create
exceptions to statutory provisions, except when these concern the
public welfare. 43 Finally, the extension of statutes without the territory of the legislator, allowed one nation by another ex comitate, is
not constrained by any law. 44 In the absence of settled practice as
in the common application of the domicilary law to universal successions as respects moveables, 45 or as may be established by treaty
or inveterate custom in the reciprocal execution of judgments, 46 exceptions to the strict right of the territorial sovereign with respect
to things within the jurisdiction are not defined by any certain rules
nor can they be deduced from any universal principles commonly
approved or tacitly received by the mutual consent of nations, but
are to be treated case by case.47 Thus, under the influence of the
theory of territorial sovereignty, the doctrine of comity restored the
primacy of the statute real, subject to such concessions as might be
made by one nation to another, not as of right but on the grounds
of utility by custom or treaty.
In the interval between the works of Paulus and Johannes Voet,
above noted, a new analysis of the problems of the conflict of laws
Johannes Voet, Op. cit., i, xi.
Ibid., viii.
Ibid., xiii-xv.
Ibid., xv.
Ibid., xviii-xxi.
Ibid., i.
Ibid., xii, xiii.
Ibid., xvii.
47. Ibid., xvi.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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was presented by Ulrik Huber, one time member of the Supreme
Court of Friesland (1679-1682) and Professor at Franeker in that
Province (1655-1679, 1682-1694).48 This appeared in three versions:
in the De Jure Civitatis in Part III added in the second edition of
1684; in the same year, also in the Beginselen der Rechtkunde
gebruikelijk in Frieslandt; and in 1689, in the Praelectiones Juris
Romani et Hodierni, Pars Secunda, which was re-edited in 1700 as
Volume II of the Praelectiones Juris Civilis. 49 Through this last
work, of which there were numerous later editions, Huber's concise
"digression," entitled De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis
Imperiis, inserted midway in Liber I of the Volume, became widely
known. The three versions differ in detail but not in substance; for
example, that in the De Jure Civitatis includes a discussion of judicial jurisdiction, which in the other versions is in part distributed
elsewhere, while the word "comiter," the stigma of the doctrine
hollandaise, appears twice in the final version in the Praelectiones
but not in the two earlier versions of 1684, in which, as Kollewijn
notes, equivalent expressions are used in the formulation of the
third rule. 150
The original explanation of Huber's conception in the De Jure
Civitatis, the first work as he claimed to treat the law of the State,
sive Juris publici universalis, so as to supplement the monumental
work of Grotius concerning the law among States, is in various respects the most illuminating. 51 In this work, the problem of conflicts
law is viewed in a different perspective than by Rodenburg and the
Voets-not in the tradition of the statutists but as an aspect of the
law governing the administration of public affairs. From this point
of view, the question is what those from different countries (exteri)
reciprocally owe to each other. Hence, among their mutual obligations, after considering those postulated by necessity, the observance
of foreign laws in other jurisdictions is appropriately included; even
48. The Academy of Franck.er was founded in 1585, the second university to be
established in the Netherlands. It was dissolved by Napoleon in 18ll.
49, For the bibliographical details, see Kollewijn, op. cit., supra note 24, at page
Ull, footnote I; Meijers, op. cit., supra note 2, at pages 653-4, footnote 3; G. de Wal,
Oratio de Claris Frisiae Jureconsultis (Leeuwarden 1825) at pages 253 ff. Unfortunately,
for want of time and available editions, it has not been feasible to reconcile certain
minor inconsistencies, not significant for the present purpose, in the above works. The
editions used are: De Jure Civitatis. Editio Tertia (ex oflicina Leonardi Strickii, a
reprint of the last edition revised by the author), Franck.er, 1698; Hedensdaegse
Rechtsgeleertheyt. Fifth Edition. Amsterdam, 1768. In this work, according to Kollewijn, the treatment of the subject in the Beginselen is reproduced "bijna ongewijzigd";
Praelectiones Juris Civilis. Volume II, Second Edition, Franck.er, 1698.
50, op. cit., supra note 24, at page 142.
51. De Jure Civitatis, Lib. III, Sect. IV, Cap. I, Nos. llff.
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if not required by treaty or by reason of subordination, the reason
of the common practice among nations (promiscui usus ratio inter
gentes) nonetheless compels mutual indulgence in this respect. For
if one nation were to refuse to recognize in any way the laws of
another, an infinite number of acts and contracts would each day
become of no effect, nor could commerce by land and by sea subsist.
In this subject matter, it is observed-the conflicts of laws occasioned by the division of Europe into numberless States, not
mutually subject to each other-the Roman jurisconsults are not
qualified authorities, nor did they treat it, since under the Roman
Empire such conflicts could scarcely arise. Since diverse peoples do
not have a common civil law, i.e., a law introduced or excogitated by
the authority of a certain people, and the law of nature is in no wise
applicable, the question must be resolved by reference to the law of
nations (e ratione juris gen tium). This difficult matter, made more
involved and perplexed by the dissensions among the most learned
jurists, Huber undertakes to explain as simply and briefly as possible, premising as a basis three "positions" or axioms, 152 which he
thinks are not subject to question.
These express nvo fundamental ideas: the principle of absolute
sovereignty applying within the territory to all subjects, including
subditi temporarii, or in other words to all persons found within the
territory; and the conception that, in international practice, the laws
of each nation exercised within its territory, are effective everywhere, insofar as the interests of another State or its citizens are not
prejudiced. The application of these postulates is illustrated by examples drawn from the practice of the courts in the Netherlands,
for the most part in Friesland, and also, in the Praelectiones, by two
additional "positions." The first of these is that all transactions and
acts, judicial or extrajudicial, mortis causa sive inter vivos, are valid
when duly celebrated in accordance with the law of a certain place,
52. "I. Leges cujusque imperii vim habent intra terminos ejusdem Reip. omnesque
ei subjectos obligant, nee ultra. per I. ult. ff. de Jurisdict. II. Pro subjectis imperio
habendi sunt omnes, qui intra terminos ejusdem reperiuntur, sive in perpetuum, sive
ad tempus ibi commorentur, per I. vii. §. 10. in fin. d. Interd. & Releg. III. Rectores
imperiorum id comiter agunt, ut jura cujusque populi intra terminos ejus exercita,
teneant ubique suam vim, quatenus nihil potestati aut juri alterius imperantis ejusque
civium praejudicetur." Huber, Praelectiones Juris Civilis, Lib. I, Tit. III. De Conflictu
Legum, 2. ["I. The laws of each state are valid within the boundaries of this state
and bind all its subjects, but not beyond•••• II. All persons who are found within
the boundaries of a state are held to be its subjects, whether they dwell there
permanently or temporarily.•.• III. The rulers of states arrange it by comity that
the laws of each nation which are enforced within its boundaries maintain their
validity everywhere, to the extent that the power or the laws of the other state and
its citizens are not prejudiced.'1
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even if, were they concluded in the same manner where the law is
different, they would be invalid. 53 On the other hand, transactions
and acts, invalid ab initio, are nowhere valid, whether as respects
those domiciled or those temporarily present in the place of contracting. In another passage, the doctrine of party autonomy is
adumbrated; if the parties to a contract celebrated in one place have
another place in view for performance, the latter place is deemed
the locus Contractus.rs 4 The second "position" is that a personal
quality, such as minority, lawfully impressed on a person in a certain place, follows the person, so that he is treated elsewhere like
persons of like quality. 55 In sum, as Huber states and holds, the
foundation of this entire doctrine is the subjection of men to the
laws of each territory in which they act, with the consequence that
an act ab initio valid or null must elsewhere be the same. 56 But this
doctrine is subject to the important exception, which Huber is at
pains to explain in various instances on grounds anticipating the
conceptions of fraude a la loi and ordre public, that the general
rule does not apply in case it is prejudicial to the interest of the
forum to give effect to a foreign law. Thus, for example, the laws
restraining alienation of immoveables are indelibly impressed on the
land in certain Provinces and cannot be altered by dispositions
under the laws of other States, without great confusion and prejudice to the Republic in which they are located.57
This superficial review of the chief works on conflict of laws that
appeared in the Netherlands during the second half of the Seventeenth Century after the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty
of modem states became generally known, notably through the De
Jure Belli ac Pacis 0£ Grotius (1625), may be resumed as follows:
I. The doctrine of territorial sovereignty is premised but with
different accents: upon things by the Voets, consistently with the
feudal regime de la realite; upon persons by Huber, following
Althusius and Grotius, and more especially upon their acts. It does
53. "Cuncta negotia &: acta tam in judicio quam extra judicium, seu mortis causft
sive inter vivas, secundum jus certi loci rite celebrata valent, etiam ubi diversa juris •
observatio viget ac ubi sic inita, quemadmodum facta sunt, non valerent." Ibid., 3.
54. Ibid., 10.
55. "Qualitates personales certo loco alicui jure impressas, ubique circumferri &:
personam comitari, cum hoc effectu, ut ubivis locorum eo jure, quo tales personae
alibi gaudent vel subjecti sunt, fruantur &: subjiciantur." Ibid., 12. Cf. Meijers, op.
cit., supra note 2, at page 657, footnote 1. ["The personal qualities impressed on a
person in a certain place by law are carried everywhere and accompany the person
wherever he goes, with the effect that he should enjoy and be subject to the same law
in every place which like persons enjoy and to which they are subject.'1
56. Ibid., 15.
57. Ibid.

28

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 65:9

not appear that Rodenburg in 1653 had considered the implications
of the doctrine for conflicts law.
2. Rodenburg and the Voets start from the traditional classification of the statutes; this is not mentioned by Huber.
3. The extraterritorial effects of statutes are explained by Rodenburg on the ground of the ipsa rei natura ac necessitas; by the Voets
ex comitate; by Huber as a fundamental axiom of the jus gentium.
The agreement of these authorities on the principle of territorial
sovereignty marks the second turning-point of fundamental significance in the evolution of the doctrine of conflicts law.

III
On the cardinal point of territorial sovereignty, there has been
no essential change since 1700; today as then, it is assumed that it is
for each State to determine, as a matter of domestic law, the extent
to which effect is given to foreign laws and judgments. It would be
a fascinating task, far too large for this essay, to trace the later variations on the solutions summarized above. But a few observations
on their differences may be added in conclusion.
The first is whether Huber may justly be regarded as an apostle
of the doctrine hollandaise, of which it has been stated that the
comitas gentium and the tripartite division of statutes, real, personal, and mixed, are the most characteristic traits. 58 Neither suits
Hube-rs view of conflicts law: the nobilissima statutorum divisio is
not considered-as he expressly states, the law of Caesar, upon which
this was predicated, is not relevant for a plurality of sovereign States
-and his fundamental principle to resolve conflicts of laws is not
comity but a rule of law based on practice. Doubtless, this is why
Huber appears to Kollewijn, who has examined the literature of the
Netherlands in this subject with most care, an isolated, paradoxical
figure, whose works, highly reputed in other countries, have had
negligible influence in his own. 59 The reason is the same: in the
Netherlands, where the hand of customary tradition lies heavy on
the evolution of legal doctrine, as Meijers' lectures at the Hague
Academy have so amply shown, 60 such iconoclasm was ignored; to
other countries, where the problem of conflicts of laws awaited
serious attention, the solution presented in Huber's Praelectiones,
stated in three unquestioned axioms without the ancient luggage,
clear, concise, practical, and modem, could not but appeal. It is of
58. Thus Meijers, op. cit., supra note 2, at page 670.
59. op. cit., supra note 24, at page 132.
60. op. cit., supra note 2.
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incidental, if piquant, interest that this, and Huber's other expositions of the topic, sparing of unnecessary citations, do not refer to
Paulus Voet, while the Appendix De Statutis of Johannes Voet,
more generous in this respect, with filial reciprocity fails to mention
Huber. Is it too much to suggest that the Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century produced nvo doctrines of conflicts law: the doctrine
hollandaise of comity and the doctrine frisonne that in this field
"goet recht ende ]ustitie" should prevail?
In the second place, it is not to be supposed that the seeming
simplicity of Huber's formulation, as compared with that of Johannes Voet for example, betokens naivete. It is recalled that Huber
was one of the leading jurists of his day-thrice appointed professor
at Franeker and thrice called to Leiden-versed not only in the civil
law but also in the practice of the courts, and in addition, through
his special interest in public law, conversant with the literature
available in the Seventeenth Century on the nature of law and
government. The experience of the Netherlands had impressed on
him the need of a central authority as well as of constitutional
government. With this background, he understood the difficulty, in
the field of conflicts law, of reconciling the existence of a plurality
of sovereign legislators with the security of transactions necessary to
maintain international commerce, and was the first to propose a
rational solution. For this he took the jus gentium, substantially as
conceived by Grotius 61-a general customary law analogous to the
law maritime and the law merchant-as the basis for the recognition
of foreign laws and judgments. But this involved the difficulty,
which Huber carefully considered in three of his works, 62 that in
61. That this conception is not identical with that of Grotius seems to have been
understood by Huber, cf. op. cit., supra note 51, Lib. I, Cap. V, 4. For the present
purpose, the difference between the two conceptions, which Kollewijn has pointed
out, op. cit., supra note 24, at pages 135ff., does not seem of importance; in fact, the
two views do not seem conclusively irreconcilable.
62. Ibid., Lib. I., Cap. V; Digressiones (Franeker, 1670) Pars II, Lib. I, Cap. IX;
Eunomia Romana (Second Edition. Amsterdam, 1724) at pages 11-13. The question is
concisely summarized by Huber as follows: "3. Sed removenda est objectio, quam
habent validam dissentientes, quod nulla sit causa necessariae obligationis, quae ad Jus
requiritur, in Jure Gentium, distincta ab ea causa, quae est in Jure Naturae 8: in
Jure Civili. Nam Jus naturae nos obligare dicunt, vi dictaminis a Deo cordibus
hominum impressi, Ius Civile niti imperio civitatis; Inter gentes diversas non est,
quod ipsas obliget inter se nee inter eas dari superiorem sine quo lex esse nequeat.
Sed ego probo, Consensum esse causam obligationis indubitatam, qui facit ipsam
legem civilem in imperio populari, ubi lex est communis Reipubl. sponsio 1.1 in fin.
& 1.2 de Legib. consensum vero, super institutis a jure naturae atque civili distinctis
c.xistere supra demonstravimus. Instant, Jus etiam requirit sanctionem, id est, puniendi
facultatem, quae utique requirit superiorem, nee est inter diversi populos imperii. Sed
negandum est, ad jus puniendi, qualitatem superioris requiri extra Civitatem: Sufficit paritas, ut Grotius bene demonstravit in lib. 3. cap. de Poenis. 8: nos in lib. I.e. I. de
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1672 in the ,,De Jure Naturae et Gentium" Pufendorf, citing the
De Give (1647) of Hobbes as authority, 63 had attacked the Grotian
conception of a jus gentium based on consent on the ground that
customs have no binding effect as law, except as they form part of
natural law or are enforced by a political superior. 64 On this crucial
question, Huber concluded that the jus gentium applying to conflicts of laws is law, since the general utiltiy of nations causes common usage giving effect to foreign laws and judgments to be held
everywhere as laws. 65 The third axiom, in which Huber's doctrine
is epitomized, enunciates that, as a general principle and practice,
the effects of competent foreign laws are everywhere admitted, except when prejudicial to the forum State or its citizens, through the
reciprocal indulgence of the sovereign authorities in each State.
This is a sophisticated solution, in which the extraterritorial recognition of rights acquired pursuant to the principle of territorial
sovereignty, subject to the exception of public policy, forms a basic
postulate of international usage inspired by comity-Rectores imperiorum id comiter agunt. On the other hand, if Huber thus stood
with Grotius, premising a rule of law, Johannes V oet took the part
of Hobbes and Pufendorf, 66 and in consequence his doctrine leaves
the decision to comity. The line between the two is fine but fundamental.
A final word. The disciples of Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Voet are
Iur. Civit." Eunomia Romana, at pages 12-13. ["But the objection which dissenters
hold valid should be discarded, namely, [the objection] that in the law of nations
there is no basis for obligations which necessarily require enforcement by law and
which is distinct from that basis which exists in the law of nature and in positive
law. They say that the law of nature binds us because the force of its command has
been impressed by God upon the hearts of men, while positive law is based upon the
power of the state; among different nations there is nothing that would bind them
together, nor is one among them conceded to be sovereign, without which law could
not exist. But I approve of the following principle, that consent is the true basis of
obligations because it creates the positive law in a nation where the law is the
common agreement of the people. • • • Indeed we demonstrated above that consent
exists over and above the diverse institutions of the law of nature and positive law.
They argne that law also requires sanction, that is, the faculty of punishing which
surely requires a sovereign, and that there is no sovereign among the rulers of different
nations. But it must be denied that the quality of a sovereign requires the right to
punish outside the territory of the state: equality suffices, as Grotius has so well
demonstrated • • • .'1
·
63. Cap. 14, 4, 5.
64. Pufendorf, op. cit., Lib. II, Cap. III, § 23.
65. " ••• utilitas promiscua gentium fecit, ut ubique pro jure habeatur." Digressiones, loc. cit., supra note 62, X.
66. "Tale enim quid inter gentes actum, tale populorum omnium, qui talium,
commune vinculum baud deprehendo.'' Op. cit., supra pages 78-79 [65 MICH. L. REY.
at 23-24] and note 39, Lib. I, Tit. I, XVIII. ["I can discern no such agreement between
nations, nor any such common bond among peoples as such.'1 [As translated in THE
SELECTIVE VOET, BEING THE COMMENTARY ON THE PANDECTS, 22 (Gane transl. 1955).]
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always with us, frequently in the majority, insisting that in the last
analysis the solution of conflicts of laws is a prerogative of sovereign
authority, in the views of some exercised primarily to protect the
local governmental interest and, where it seems expedient in this
interest, to satisfy the requirements of international commerce. And
there even have been some who, as would Carneades, regard consideration of justice in this field an illusion, and law in reality an
emanation of power, the dictate of the ruling class. But it is noteworthy that since 1700 the works concerned with private international law whose influence has been the most durable and extensive, those of Story, Savigny, Dicey, and Niboyet for example,
directly or mediately, have followed the main lines that Huber
marked out-the sovereign authority of the national legislator, recognition of transactions as declared by the proper law, except when
unduly prejudicial to the interests of the State or its citizens, and
the effort by construction of a common law, whether derived from
judicial decisions or from doctrine, to provide principles enabling
the questions arising from the diversity of laws and commerce with
other countries to be decided on a rational basis.
The main change since 1700 has been that the legal materials in
each country have become vastly more prolific and complex, and in
varying degree have been codified, with the result that the ius
gentium of Grotius and Huber tends more and more to be a plurality of national common laws, each pretending to be universal. To
the extent that this basic element for the solution of conflicts of
laws has thus been provincialized, it obviously becomes the less
adequate to satisfy the needs of a world in which commerce is increasingly mondial, and not merely international, and in which
there has been a marked expansion of trade conducted by national
or international agencies. Hence, since international commerce demands an adequate international law, public and private, for transactions in which such agencies as well as individuals may participate,
a need imperfectly satisfied under existing conditions, the dispute
between Grotius and Hobbes whether international custom can be
a source of law is today renewed between their intellectual descendants, and there is a call to resurrect the jus gentium of the Seventeenth Century in the guise of transnational law or the general
principles of law.
To realize such conceptions and to resolve such disputes, it is
evident that intensive comparative studies are indispensable. For
this reason, it is but fitting to refer in conclusion to the outstanding
comparative contribution in this field, the monumental survey of
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The Conflict of Laws,67 that the late Ernst Rabel himself prepared
under the auspices of the Institut fiir auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht and the Law School of the University of Michigan. This is the chief among his works relating to conflicts law that
herald what has been happily named a third school of private international law, 68 like the doctrine of Ulrik Huber mediating bet:1veen
a priori reason and positivist practice, and seeking through improved comparative inquiry to realize "goet recht ende ]ustitie."
67. Ernst Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study. 4 Volumes (First
Edition, Ann Arbor 1945-58).
68. K. Zweigert, Die dritte Schule im internationalen Privatrecht: Festschrift fiir
Leo Raape (Hamburg 1948) 35-52.

